Keeping Our Skies Safe
Families of Flight 5342 on Aviation Safety Reform

The safety of our skies must begin with a simple principle:
The value of human life must come before capacity, convenience, or cost.

The Flight 5342 disaster was not the result of a single mistake, but of multiple systems pushed past safe limits: an air traffic control workforce stretched thin, an Army helicopter flying without broadcasting critical safety signals, and an airport running with too little margin for error. Too often, agencies settled for check-the-box compliance and paperwork while real risks went unaddressed.

Since January 29th, investigations and hearings have revealed more about what failed. We now see with greater clarity how oversight gaps, outdated systems, and misaligned priorities compounded into disaster. Our reform priorities are therefore updated to reflect both the lessons learned and the progress made in the months since.

Our goal is not just to fix individual gaps - though there are many - but to create a system where human life is the first calculation, not the final cost - a system where transparency, closed-loop accountability, and proactive management of our skies are the norm.

We call on Congress, the FAA, the Department of Transportation, and our military to make good on their fundamental promise to the American people: to keep us safe, to manage our skies responsibly, and to lead with integrity. The Families of Flight 5342 believe this requires that these seven reform goals be comprehensively and swiftly addressed so that safety comes from foresight and accountability, not from tragedy.

1. Fix FAA Failures With Strategic, Benchmark-Driven Reform

Gap: FAA ignored warnings, left controllers understaffed and modernization adrift.
Reform: Mandate benchmark-driven reforms, independent oversight, and transparent staffing and modernization plans.

  • A combination of policy and unit practice resulted in a Black Hawk flying in Class B airspace without ADS-B, on different frequencies, and occasionally above local altitude authorization.

    These conditions reduced observability and narrowed safety margins - erasing layers of protection that other pilots and controllers relied on. Unit-level choices, such as shutting off ADS-B or routing training into congested airspace, should never be allowed to compromise the safety of the National Airspace System.

  • Army aviation policies that default to maximum visibility and coordination in shared corridors.

    Risky training is confined to appropriate environments, decision-making authority is aligned with FAA and DoD policy, and civilian protection is treated as a baseline, not an afterthought.

    • Independent accountability: The DOT Inspector General has accepted a request to investigate FAA oversight failures that allowed risks at DCA to persist. IG findings should set the baseline for reforms.

    • Benchmark-driven modernization: Require the FAA to produce multi-year modernization plans tied to measurable safety outcomes (e.g., fewer loss-of-separation incidents, less forced controller overtime, faster deployment of safety tech). These plans must spell out timelines, funding needs, and independent review mechanisms.

      Critically, the plan is not the product. It cannot be written once and left to stagnate for a decade. Plans must be updated regularly, with adjustments based on performance, emerging risks, and lessons learned - so that modernization is a living process, not a static document that drifts while the system remains unsafe.

    • ATC workforce readiness: The FAA must fix the current staffing shortage that leaves controllers stretched beyond safe limits. Steps are being taken - like accelerated hiring and academy expansions - but they are not enough to restore margins quickly. Beyond headcount, controllers must undergo independent, recurring certification and high-fidelity simulation training. Progress should be audited annually and made public so that safety improvements are transparent and measurable.

    • Infrastructure Upgrades: Our air traffic control infrastructure is decades out of date, and leaders across parties, industry, and the safety community agree this is critical to fix. While $12.5 billion has been secured, that is not nearly enough to meet the scale of the challenge.

    The Department of Transportation and FAA must own and deliver a credible, phased modernization plan - one that the public can see, measure, and hold accountable. That plan should:

    • Identify specific priorities, benchmarks, and outcomes tied to measurable safety and efficiency improvements.

    • Lay out a phased approach that delivers tangible value along the way -avoiding another “NextGen,” where benefits were diffuse, delayed, and accountability was lost.

    • Be paired with independent oversight and regular public reporting so Congress and the public can track progress and demand course corrections.

    Congress should provide resources up front, insulate the process from political brinkmanship and shutdowns, and hold DOT and FAA accountable to the plan. Modernization cannot be allowed to stall under budget fights or shifting political winds.

    • Roadmap to Next-Generation Collision Avoidance (ACAS X): Congress should require the FAA to deliver a national roadmap and phased implementation plan for collision-avoidance systems, culminating in full ACAS X deployment. The plan must identify and enforce the essential building blocks - ADS-B In/Out equipage (dual-band for universal visibility), civil-military frequency coordination, and integration with existing TCAS systems - as prerequisites for ACAS X. With clear timelines, milestones, enforcement mechanisms, and transparent public reporting, this roadmap will ensure steady progress toward a universal, interoperable collision-avoidance capability that closes the gaps exposed by Flight 5342.

  • A modern FAA cannot emerge from vague promises or ad hoc upgrades. Only outcome-based planning with regular, independent review can ensure the system keeps pace with volume, complexity, and evolving threats.

2. Fix Army Aviation Failures and Require Operational Accountability

Gap: Army Black Hawks flew invisible and unsafe in crowded civilian airspace.
Reform: Enforce ADS-B use, restrict risky training, and require IG/GAO reviews with public accountability.

  • A combination of policy and unit practice resulted in a Black Hawk flying in Class B airspace without ADS-B, on different frequencies, and occasionally above local altitude authorization.

    These conditions reduced observability and narrowed safety margins - erasing layers of protection that other pilots and controllers relied on. Unit-level choices, such as shutting off ADS-B or routing training into congested airspace, should never be allowed to compromise the safety of the National Airspace System.

  • Army aviation policies that default to maximum visibility and coordination in shared corridors. Risky training is confined to appropriate environments, decision-making authority is aligned with FAA and DoD policy, and civilian protection is treated as a baseline, not an afterthought.

    • Army IG and GAO reviews: Congress should direct both offices to conduct independent reviews with distinct purposes. The Army or DoD Inspector General should examine compliance breakdowns, decision-making authority, and transparency in surveillance and altitude practices. The GAO should evaluate the overall efficacy of Army training programs for pilots - including flight time requirements, measurement of proficiency, and risk-mitigation protocols - and identify areas where training doctrine must improve to meet shared safety needs. Findings from both reviews must be made public.

    • ADS-B policy reform: Army policies that deactivate ADS-B in civilian corridors must be rescinded or strictly limited to narrowly defined national security missions. Congress should require annual compliance reports to confirm usage.

    • Training practices: High-risk exercises, such as night-vision goggle flights, should be routed outside the highest-density civilian airspace unless robust safety mitigations are in place. GAO should specifically evaluate how training doctrine accounts for civilian risk and whether adjustments are required.

    • Transparency requirements: The Army must provide Congress with policy documents, compliance rates, and corrective actions without delay, ending the pattern of withholding or slow-walking critical information.

  • Civilian passengers should never be collateral to military training policies. Independent, enforceable review is the only way to ensure that the Army aligns its aviation practices with shared safety, and that its training programs strengthen pilots without weakening protections for the traveling public.